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would seem more analogous to the tax cases 47 where the anonymity
of the client conceals transactions in payment of delinquent taxes
which are subject to governmental sanctions. These payments have
not been deemed per se to be beyond the scope of the attorney-client
privilege. The privilege has been held applicable to these situations
because disclosure of the client's identity would lead to governmental
investigations. The attorneys who withheld their clients' names in
these cases were not considered to be using the purivilege as a cloak
for wrongdoing.
The Hughes decision seems to lack consideration of the history
and policy of the limitation in applying it to the delivery of stolen
property to the police. Instead of considering the action of the
attorney as a concealment to avoid justice, the Court should recognize
the value of the recovery of stolen property. To require disclosure in
such circumstances, the Court requires the attorney to incriminate his
client to the point that any defense is crippled if not rendered
impossible.
W. Stokes Harris, Jr.

CONSITUTIONAL LAw-SCHOOL
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DRxss CODES-A STmUN'r's BIGBT TO

LENrm.-Breen and Anton, students at a
public high school, were expelled for wearing hair longer than that
allowed by a school regulation.1 Anton had his hair cut and was
readmitted, but Breen refused to comply and was denied readmission.
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, petitioned by the
students, found that the proceeding was moot in the case of Anton
and that the expulsion was warranted in Breen's case. The Superintendent's finding was not that the student's long hair was disruptive,
but that refusal to comply with the regulation was a disruptive influence warranting expulsion. A federal district court ordered the students reinstated,2 and the school officials appealed. Held: Affirmed.
The right of a student to wear his hair at any length or in any desired
CHOOSE

HAm STr.E AND

47Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
1The regulation, similar to haircut regulations found in dress and appearance
codes in other schools, stated:
Hair should be washed, combed and worn so it does not hang below the
collar line in back, over the ears on the side and must be above the
eyebrows. Boys should be clean shaven; long sideburns are out. 419
F.2d at 1035.
2 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
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manner is protected by either the first or the ninth amendment of the
United States Constitution, and absent a valid showing of justification,
the school could not properly threaten to expel and/or expel students
for violation of a regulation governing acceptable hair length. Breen
v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, -

U.S. -,

90

S. Ct. 1836 (1970).
It is well recognized that school authorities may make reasonable
rules and regulations 3 pertaining to students in order to maintain an
efficient educational system.4 "Courts do not and cannot intervene in
the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of the
school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values" 5 However, where it can be shown that a rule
is arbitrary or unreasonable, the courts will intervene and refuse to
uphold the enforcement of such a regulation. 6 School regulation
decisions handed down by the courts reflect that the factual situation
and the tenor of the times determine the extent that schools may
7
control matters of personal preference such as appearance.
3 See generally Taylor, With Temperate Rod: MaintainingAcademic Order in
Secondary Schools, 58 Ky. L.J. 616 (1970). The source of this authority is
typically found in state statute, see, e.g., Ky. REV. STATS. § 160.290 (1934) which
vests broad powers and responsibilities as follows:
(1) Each board of education shall have general control and management
of the public schools in its district and may establish such schools and
provide for such courses and other services as it deems necessary for the
promotion of education and the general health and welfare of pupils,
consistent with rules and regulations of the State Board of Education....
(2) Each board shall make and adopt ... rules, regulations and bylaws
* . . for the qualification and employment of teachers and the conduct of
pupils
....
4
See, e.g., Ferrel v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (upholding a regulation banning long hair);
Blackwell v. Issaquena Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding
a regulation barring the wearing of "freedom buttons"); Byrd v. Gary, 184 F.Supp.
388 (E.D.S.C. 1960) (upholding the suspension of a student attempting to
organize a milk boycott); Bd. of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d
854 (1967) (upholding a regulation excluding married students from extracurricular activities)- Carr v. Dighton, 294 Mass. 304, 118 N.E. 525 (1918)
(upholding the expulsion of a student with head lice); Stromberg v. French, 60
N.D. 750, 236 N.W. 477 (1936) (upholding a regulation forbidding the use of
metal heel plates on shoes); Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn.
29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957) (upholding a regulation which suspends for the
remainder of the school year students who marry).
5 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
"See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (striking down a rule prohibiting the wearing of black armbands); Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1970) (expulsion under a school haircut regulation
invalid); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (striking down a rule
prohibiting the wearing of "freedom buttons"); Anderson v. Canyon Ind. School
Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (striking down a regulation requiring students, married during the school year, to withdraw from school).
7E. RuETTz & R. HAMmITON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 509 (1970).
Compare Blackwell v. Issaquena Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), with
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).

KETcK

LAw JOuBNAL

(Vol. 59.

Litigation involving student dress and appearance codes has
increased significantly in the past five years." The issue now is, or is
rapidly becoming, something of a tempest in a teapot.9 As early as
1923, an Arkansas court in Pugsley v. Sellmeyer"° upheld the right of
a public school to exclude a female student for violation of a rule
against the use of talcum powder as a facial cosmetic. It was emphasized that the discretionary power of the school authorities to
formulate rules would not be infringed upon because the court did
not approve of those rules, or they were not essential for the
maintenance of discipline. The only finding necessary for the court
to uphold this rule was that it be "reasonably calculated to effect the
8 The courts, in determining the validity of dress code regulations, have been
in technical agreement in that they require justification for any infringement on
the constitutional right of the student to govern his personal appearance. The
issue has become whether or not the student's right to govern his personal
appearance is constitutionally protected, and if so, whether or not the state has
met its burden of showing substantial justification for infringement on that right.
For haircut cases holding against the student see, e.g., Griffin v. Tatum, 425
F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969)
(affirmed the reinstatement of a suspended student because a hair regulation did
not apply to that student, but reversed the striking of the entire hair style regulation); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 19 70 ); Ferrel v. Dallas Ind.
School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968);
Fitzpatrick v. Garrison, Civil No. 2050 (W.D. Ky., May 5, 1970) (moustaches);
Brownlee v. Bradley County Bd., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Lovelace
v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (regulation
prohibiting moustaches was reasonable but arbitrarily applied to a student with
practically imperceptable natural growth moustache); Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F.
Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F.
Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (moustaches); Brick v. Bd. of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316
(D. Colo. 1969); Crews v. Clones, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969); Davis v.
Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th
Cir. 1969); Akin v. Bd. of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968);
Leonard v. School Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
For haircut cases holding for the students see, e.g., Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (due process clause of the fourteenth amendment);
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct.
1836 (1970) (penumbra of first amendment or ninth amendment); Westley v.
Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969) (equal protection clause and due
process clause); Off v. E. Side Union High School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 557 (N.D.
Cal. 1969) (due process); Meyers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal.
App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969) (first amendment); Finot v. Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App 2d 189 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (first amendment).
9 Ferrel v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 705 (5th Cir. 1968)
(dissenting opinion). For general discussions of school dress and appearance codes
see Note, School Student Dress and Appearance Regulations, 18 CE.-MAR. L.
RPv. 143 (1969); Note, A Re-Evaluation of School Appearance Regulations: Is
Free Choice In Grooming Accorded ConstitutionalProtection?,15 S.D. L. REv. 94
(1970); Comment, The Right To Dress and Go To School, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV.
492 (1965); Comment, A Student's Right To Govern His PersonalAppearance, 68
J. PuB. L. 151 (1968); Comment, Constitutional Law-Public School Authorities
Regulating the Style of a Students Hair, 47 N.C. L. REV. 171 (1968); 20 ALA. L.

Rnv. 104 (1967).

10 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
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purpose intended, that is, of promoting discipline in the school.""1
The wisdom or expediency of a rule was not a criterion to be considered in testing for reasonableness.
Relying on the test for reasonableness laid down in Pugsley, a
Massachusetts court in Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro 2
upheld a school regulation governing the length of students' hair. No
evidence of any disruption was offered, but the court thought that "the
unusual hair style of the plaintiffs could disrupt and impede the
maintenance of a proper classroom atmosphere and decorum . . .
and could result in the distraction of other pupils."' 3 (Emphasis
added.) The court dismissed an argument that the regulation touched
on matters occurring at home that were in exclusive control of the
parents, and thus an invasion of family privacy. By application of
the balancing of interest technique, it was determined that the domain
of family privacy must give way to the paramount interest of students,
teachers, administrators and the community in a well run and efficient
school system. 14
A haircut regulation was attacked on the grounds that it was a
denial of substantive and procedural due process under the fourteenth
amendment in the case of Ferrel v. Dallas Independent School District. 15 The student's contention was that the length and style of hair
is not unlike constitutionally protected thought and speech. The court
in its examination of the reasonableness of the regulation took account
of the factual setting in which it was enforced.16 Testimony as to
the disruptive influence of long hair was taken on behalf of the
student and the school authorities.' 7 Without deciding the issue of
11 Id.at -, 250 S.W. at 539. Accord Leonard v. School Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
12 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
13 Id. at
, 212 N.E.2d at 472.
'
at--Id.212 N.E.2d at 472. This argument lost much of its persuasiveness
since evidence was not p resented to show that long hair would be disruptive.
15 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). The
opinion in this case brought forth the following conclusion:
'We conclude... that a regulation banning extreme hairstyles should not
be considered arbitrary or unreasonable if the regulation may be reasonably calculated to prevent a material adverse effect on school discipline,
health or decorum. 69 Op. ATr'r GE. 423 (1969).' (Emphasis added.)
1l Id.at 702. The court said:
[E]ach case must be decided in its own particular setting and factual
background . . .in determining whether the rule or the action about
which the complaint is made is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or
discriminatory.
Id.
17 Testimony on the student's behalf was essentially that long hair was
currently in vogue among students. Testimony by school authorities consisted of
accounts of disruptions that had occurred in the past involving students with long
hair and fear of what might occur in the future if students were allowed to wear
long hair.
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long hair as symbolic speech, the court assumed that it was such and
stated that there is no absolute right to free expression of ideas.18
The state may infringe upon such a right if there are compelling
reasons to do so.19

A student attacked a school haircut regulation as being in violation
of the first, eighth and ninth amendments in Davis v. Firment.20 The

court found that the regulation suppressed no right guaranteed by
the first amendment. Recognizing that symbolic expression is entitled
to first amendment protection, 21 the court said:
A symbol must symbolize a specific idea or viewpoint. A symbol
is merely a vehicle by which a concept is transmitted from one
person to another; unless it represents a particular idea, a symbol
22
becomes meaningless. It is in effect not really a symbol at all.
Even if long hair is a form of symbolic expression, the court reasoned
it would still be subject to state regulation in the furtherance of a
state interest. There was uncontradicted evidence that the haircut
regulation was based on disciplinary considerations.2 3 However, the

factual situation was one in which there was no disruption caused
18 For an opinion that there is an absolute right to free expression of ideas
see Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting):
As I have said many times I believe the Federal Government is without
any power whatever under the Constitution to put any type of burden on
speech and expression of ideas of any kind (as distinguished from
conduct).... Id. at 476.
19 A compelling reason is the interest in the maintenance of an effective and
efficient school system. Ferrel v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d at 703.
2 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), affd per curiam, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th
Cir. 1969).
21 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). It
was held that the first amendment prohibited the coercion of a pledge to the flag
by school children. The flag itself was said to be symbolic of the government as it
is presently organized while the pledge required the individual to communicate
by word
and sign adherence to that government.
22
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. La. 1967). But see Meyers
v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 120, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969),
where the court, speaking of hair as a symbol, said:
Its symbolic value ... need not be judicially assessed: the symbolism is
subjective in the person wearing it.... If a growth of hair means anything
to its wearer (including his right to wear it long), the first amendment
protects him in affecting it, and this is so whether he displays it on his
chin or on his scalp. Adulthood is not a prerequisite: the state and its
educational agencies must heed the constitutional rights of all persons,
74 Cal. Rptr. at 73 n.6.
2including school boys. 269 Cal. App. 2d at -,
3The evidence offered was testimony by school officials, one of whom stated:
There is a distinct and direct relationship between student dress and
conduct ... Gross deviation from the norm does cause a disruption of
learning atmosphere and can create an undesirable separateness among
students. Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. at 528.
Another school official gave testimony that fights had occurred because of
derogatory remarks made to students with long hair and that extreme hair styles
have caused distractions and disturbances in the classroom. Id.
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by the plaintiff's hair, but rather by prior disruptions caused by the
hair of another student. The court dismissed as being wholly without
merit the argument that to make a student cut his hair in order to
go to school was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment.24
The student in Davis also argued that the ninth amendment
guarantees a "fundamental free choice of grooming" under the
rationale of Griswold v. Connecticut.25 The Davis court did not agree:
If this case is to fall within the ambit of Griswold, there must be
some specific provision or provisions of the Bill of Rights from
which student Davis' right of grooming emanates, or if it is
of Justice Goldberg, 26 the right
permissible to follow the approach
27
must be at least fundamental.
The court concluded that a right of free choice of grooming has no
base in any guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and, while the right of
marital privacy recognized in Griswold may be so sacred as to be
28
fundamental, the right of free choice of grooming is not.
Ferrel was followed in Jackson v. Dorrier, a leading sixth circuit
haircut case decided after Breen. The facts in Jackson were strikingly
similar to those in Ferrel. Evidence was presented to show that the

wearing of excessively long hair by two male students disrupted
classroom decorum by distracting other students thereby impeding
the educational process.3 0 The court found: that the regulation did
not deprive the students of free speech in violation of the first
amendment since the students' hair, by their own admission was not
intended as an expression of any idea; 31 that the students had not
24 Id.at 524.
25 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance. There are zones of privacy and repose created hy the various
rights, and the court held that the marital relationship was within the zone of
privacy created by several constitutional guarantees. Id. at 484-85.
26 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The language and history of the
ninth amendment clearly show that there are certain fundamental rights not
specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments. By judicial examination of
the traditions and conscience of the people, it could be determined that marital
privacy is such a right. The fifth and the fourteenth amendments prohibit
by the state of such fundamental rights.
abridgement
27
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. at 529.
28 Id.
29424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970).
o Id.at 216-17. While there were some obscure threats by other students to
cut the long hair of these students, the court seemed to be mainly influenced by
the opinions of teachers and administrators that long hair was distracting to other
students. Also that there were disciplinary problems created by the deliberate
flaunting of the haircut rule by these students.
at 217.
31 I-d.
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been deprived of due process under the fourteenth amendment in
32
light of the conferences and hearings held before their suspension;
that the regulation was not void for vagueness and overbreadth
because it clearly informed the students as to the schoors grooming
requirements and was uniformly applied; 33 that there was no denial
of equal protection of the laws since the record was barren of proof
that there was a selective enforcement against these students; 4 and
that there was no merit in the record that the students' constitutional
right of privacy had been impaired in violation of the first, third,
fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.8 5
Relying on Jackson, a federal district court in Kentucky held in
Fitzpatrick v. Garrison3 6 that, as a matter of law, the provisions of a
school dress code relating to length of hair and wearing of chains
were void for vagueness and overbreadth, but upheld a provision of
the code prohibiting moustaches. The students, all black, argued that
the moustache ban violated their first amendment right to freedom of
speech and their fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of
the laws. The two contentions were interrelated in that the moustaches
were symbols of racial pride and manhood and that the students
were prohibited from wearing them because of their race. The court
found that the regulation as drawn and applied went to all male
students and thus there was no denial of equal protection.37 The first
amendment argument was negated by the apparent insincerity of the
students as to what the moustaches actually expressed. 8 Even if the
students were sincere, the court questioned whether such an expression
was basic enough to warrant intervention into a school operation.39
The court's only requirement for the rule was that there be a reasonable
connection between the rule and the maintenance of school dis-

cipline.

40

The factual situation examined by the court was that the moustaches
32 Id.

33 Id. at 217-18.
34 Id. at 218.

35Id. In the court's opinion, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
had no application to this case.
36 Civil No. 2050 (W.D. Ky., May 5, 1970). See also Fey v. Sell, Civil No.
1489 37(E.D. Ky., Feb. 26, 1970).
Fitzpatrick v. Garrison, Civil No. 2050 at 3. A white student had been
suspended with the black students but was readmitted after shaving his moustache.
38 Id. At any earlier hearing the students stated that they grew the
moustaches "just because they wanted to." Id.
89 Id. at 3-4. The court refused to equate expressions of manhood to
expressions about international commitments of the United States. See Tinker v.
Des Moines Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment guarantees
student right to symbolically express dissatisfaction with American commitments
by wearing
black armbands).
4
o Fitzpatrick v. Garrison, Civil No. 2050 at 4.
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were neat and orderly and no disruption had arisen because of them
other than the disruption from refusal to obey the rule.41 The school
officials offered justification for the rule by stressing the need to
establish some cut-off point in order to avoid future school disruptions.
In other words, to discourage students from attempting to discover
the outer limits of any rule allowing moustaches, it would be easier to
prohibit them altogether. Although the court felt that this was poor
justification for an innocent act, the espoused purpose of the rule
was reasonable and therefore the court would not interfere.
The right of a student to wear his hair at any length was held in
Breen to be a constitutionally protected personal freedom. This
freedom was said to fall within the "penumbras" of the first amendment's freedom of speech or within the ninth amendment's "additional fundamental rights not specifically mentioned in the first eight
constitutional amendments." 42 This right is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.
The court recognized that students' rights in the area of personal
grooming were subject to limitations on a showing of substantial
justification by school authorities because of some paramount state
interest.43 The court stated the requirements of substantial justification:
'A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated in the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 44
The justification advanced was that the long hair distracted other
students and that students who conform to community standards do
better both in academic work and extracurricular activities. Although
several educational administrators offered opinions to this effect, the
court stressed that the record was void of any evidence of actual
distraction. The record was equally barren of facts or empirical
studies to substantiate the allegation that long-haired students do not
perform as well as short-haired students.4 5
411d. For an opinion that clean and neat is not a redeeming feature by which
extreme hair styles, beards or moustaches must be excluded from school regulations see 69 Op.Arr'y GEN. 423 (1969).
42 See note 25-26 supra, and accompanying text.
43
44

1036.

See note 19 supra.

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), cited in 419 F.2d at

45 296 F. Supp. at 708-09. The distraction and performance factor of students
with long hair were findings of fact made by the district court.
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The school board advanced arguments to uphold the regulation
on three grounds. First, the disciplinary powers of school authorities
in formulating regulations for the efficient operation of schools would
be greatly diminished unless its rules were vindicated by the courts.
This argument was dismissed by the court stating that it would
interfere with school conflicts where they "directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 46 Second, the doctrine of "in loco
parentis"4 7 was said to apply. While recognizing the doctrine's value
in regard to certain matters, the court said that it is a power to be
shared with the parents. The doctrine had no applicability to this
case because the parents were in court with their son aiding his effort
to retain the right to wear his hair as he chose. Third, it was argued
that invalidating this rule would open a floodgate of litigation in the
federal courts. The court answered that to yield to this fear would
be to abdicate its judicial duty to arbitrate the validity of laws and
protect the public from the unconstitutional exercise of governmental
power.

48

Decisions on student haircut provisions of dress and appearance
regulations have too often been based on the discouragement of
disruption which a principal thinks might occur. The courts before
Breen paid lip service to a factual setting in which disruption of the
educational system did occur, while in reality enforcing the personal
preferences of school administrators. Substantial justification for any
school regulation' can be found if the courts refuse to look at the
specific facts of the case and consider only what has happened in
the past or what could happen in the future. To be sure, long hair
may be the source of some trouble in the classroom, 49 but it has not
been demonstrated how long hair could have such an adverse effect
as to threaten the state's interest in an efficient educational system.
46 Epperson

v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), cited in 419 F.2d at 1037.
47 For a discussion of this doctrine and other non-constitutional aspects of
school authority to regulate student conduct and status see Goldstein, The Scope
and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status:
A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (1969).
48419 F.2d at 1038. A similar argument was advanced in Griffin v. Tatum,
300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969), rev'd in part, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970).

The court said that this proposition could apply to any rule and if accepted would

mean49that the student has no rights.
Priscilla Robertson, chairwoman of the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union's
academic freedom committee, agreeing that student dress should not be disruptive or constitute a danger, stated:
'I can see rules such as having no long hair waving around Bunsen
burners in a chemistry lab. But the burden of proof of what is disruptive or dangerous falls on the school system not the student. Helm,
A Dress Affair, The Courier Journal (Louisville, Ky.), April 3, 1970,
§ 1, at 1, col. 6.

CoMMNrs
The holding in Breen is an encouraging step in the recognition of
student rights in at least the area of his personal appearance. It is
unfortunate that a factual situation in which there was evidence of
actual disruption caused by a student's long hair was not presented
to the court, for dictum in the opinion indicates that the court may
have nevertheless reached the same result.5 0 Such a decision should
be reached by using a balancing of interest test-the constitutional
right of a student in deciding how to wear his hair balanced against
the disruption of the educational system caused by those who would

deny him this right.51
Social norms fluctuate and it is essential that courts keep pace
with the change by protecting basic constitutional rights. Long hair
may not yet be accepted as the norm but it is at least accepted,
particularly among those of school age. It is unlikely that a court
today would find a substantial justification sufficient to warrant a ban
against the use of cosmetics and hosiery by female students.5 2 The
same rule should be applied to regulations of the length of a student's
hair.
That Breen recognized the constitutional right of a student to
govern his own hair style and length clearly seems the better course.
Equally wise was the court's decision to require justification for the
rule supported by the facts of the case. While-the court left open the
50

Discussing a situation in which there might have been disruption caused
by the student's long hair, the court said:
We are more inclined to agree with Judge Tuttle's dissenting opinion in
Ferrel that "courts are too prone to permit a curtailment of a constitutional right of a dissenter, because of the likelihood that it bring
disorder, resistance or improper and even violent action by those supporting the status quo... " 419 F.2d at 1037.
51 SeRichards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969) (second
supplementary opinion), crff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). Commenting on a
case where a student was denied relief for suspension for long hair which caused
other students to be disorderly, the court stated:
This court takes the position that that is not a valid ground for denying
plaintiffs liberty to wear hair as he pleases. A man may not be
restrained 'from doing a lawful act merely because he knows that his
doing it may cause another to do an unlawful act.' Id. at 454, citing
Beatty v. Gillbanks, 9 Q.B.D. 308, 314 (1882) (where it was held that
the Salvation Army could not be forbidden to parade merely because
hostile groups chose to start a disturbance).
Another district court expressed the same view in regard to the actions of other
students:
The exercise of a constitutional right cannot be curtailed because of an
undifferentiated fear that the exercise of that right will produce a violent
reaction on the part of those who would deprive one of the exercise
of that constitutional right. Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D.
Ala. 1969), rev'd in part, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970).
52 See text at note 10 supra.

248

KmNTucKY LAW JOURNAL

53
possibility of upholding haircut regulations for some justifiable cause,
it took a giant stride in advancing this area of the law to a position
in step with both current social changes and recent decisions involving
the constitutional rights of youth.54

John D. Hays
53

Addressing itself to the problem of justification for a school regulation, one
court has stated:
There might be a sharing of reasonable disciplinary demands which
would be determinative.... But an attempt to impose conformity for the
sake of conformity or merely to accord with a principal's prejudices is not
entitled to prevail over the personal liberty of a student to choose his hair
style. Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449,454 (D. Mass. 1969) (supplementary opinion, aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
54 The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment applies to delinquency proceedings in the state courts. Due process
of law requires: that notice of the charges be given; that before a court hearing
the child and his parents be notified of the right to be represented by counsel and to
have counsel appointed if they cannot afford their own; that the child be advised
of his right against self-incrimination and that absent a valid confession, adjudication of delinquency must be based on sworn testimony of witnesses available
for confrontation and cross-examination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

